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Title:
Intelligence failures in Vietnam : suggestions for reform
Date of Creation:
January 24, 1969
Type of Document:
Memorandum
Level of Classification:
NOT GIVEN
Status of Copy:
SANITIZED
Pagination, Illustration:
35 p.
Abstract:
Intelligence Failures in Vietnam: Suggestions
for Reform [lack of foresight, neglect of
fundamentals, absence of clear central
direction caused "three massive US
intelligence failures": (1) US intelligence
failed to gauge scope of war, underestimating
size, strength, enemy order of battle,
infiltration rates, etc.; (2) second basic
failure has been neglect by US intelligence
of enemy's power, the Communist Party and its
related bureaucracies: the "infrastructure".
Consequences of this neglect have been
"momentous". The Allies' best-conceived
scheme, PHOENIX program, did not get off the
ground; (3) frequent inability of the Allies
to fathom enemy's intentions, most
prominently, the failure to predict the Tet
offensive, due mostly to CIA's lack of
success in espionage. Three general
recommendations conclude memorandum: (a) set
up Board of Inquiry to examine overall
intelligence in Vietnam and elsewhere; (b)
short term recommendations, geared mostly to
ensure effectiveness of PHOENIX program; (c)
other longer term recommendations designed to
correct basic ills of intelligence research].
Memorandum, Samuel A. Adams. Jan. 24, 1969.
35 p., appendix, charts. Security
classification not given. SANITIZED copy.
Released date not given.
Indexing Terms:
US INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
MISJUDGING SCOPE OF WAR
NEGLECT OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS BUREAUCRACIES
INABILITY TO PREDICT
COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE
TET OFFENSIVE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MACV
VIET CONG SECURITY SERVICES
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
PHOENIX PROGRAM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
WILLIAM WESTMORELAND
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
PRISONERS OF WAR
NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
CREDIBILITY GAP
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MISJUDGING SCOPE OF WAR
NEGLECT OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS BUREAUCRACIES
INABILITY TO PREDICT
COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE
TET OFFENSIVE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MACV
VIET CONG SECURITY SERVICES
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
PHOENIX PROGRAM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
WILLIAM WESTMORELAND
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
PRISONERS OF WAR
NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
CREDIBILITY GAP
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified Documents Reference System Location:
1975-250C
Link to Full Text: