Declassified CIA documents on the Vietnam War - University Library

Document abstracts from U.S. Declassified Documents Online are included with permission from the Gale Group. U.S. Declassified Documents Online requires a subscription to access. Current USask library patrons can use their NSID and password to access the collection through our subscription. The USask Library cannot provide access to full-text documents for anyone outside our institution. Check with your local library to see if they subscribe.

Full-text documents may be available online from Texas Tech University's Virtual Vietnam Archive.

Learn more about the project: Lam, Vinh-The, and Darryl Friesen. "A Web-based Database of CIA Declassified Documents on the Vietnam War." Online 28, no. 4 (2004): 31-35.

Advanced search...

Title:

Nation in ferment : national elections and political permutations in South Vietnam

Date of Creation:

April 19, 1967

Date of Declassification:

April 21, 1993

Type of Document:

Memorandum

Level of Classification:

SECRET

Status of Copy:

SANITIZED

Pagination, Illustration:

21 p.

Abstract:

The development of a much-needed political base for the Vietnamese government is slowly gaining momentum. The movement toward representative and effective governmental institutions has been complicated by divisive political and social influences and an absence of unifying traditions or institutions, as well as by intensified Communist political and military efforts. Having stabilized the situation, Vietnam's military leadership remains largely unified in its reluctance to relinquish its dominant position, but recognizes the need to share power with civilian elements in order to gain the popular support needed to counter the disciplined Communist political threat. Since its inception the Ky government has been consciously moving toward a transition to at least ostensible civilian rule along the Korean pattern. Because of their dominant position, the leaders of the military establishment have considerable assets to assist in accomplishing their aims, including funds, patronage, and the only non-Communist organization reaching down to the grass roots. To bolster their prospects, the military are attempting to form a loose political front composed of representatives of various religious and political groups which will sponsor GVN-endorsed candidates in the forthcoming elections. If the military establishment can agree on a single slate and a single presidential candidate to support, none of the potential civilian candidates appears likely to develop the organization and broad spectrum of support necessary to seriously contest the military establishment's choice. This is particularly true if, as seems to be certain the case, the oppostion to the military's choice is divided among two or more slates. Both the Suu and Huong tickets seem destined to split the important southern vote. None of the other candidates seem likely to muster more than nominal regional support. Major issues in the elections are likely to stem largely from opposition to the concept of continued military control of the government. The opposition probably will focus on the related issues of corruption, inflation, and inefficiency of the military establishment, and may label Ky as a US puppet. The themes of peace and neutrality may also be espoused by the opposition, whose position would thus take on significant anti-American undertones. Despite this, it seems unlikely that the campaign will get too far off the track, although the possibility of flashes of violence cannot be ruled out completely. Other potential pitfalls include the danger that the military, unduly concerned over their prospects for victory, may attempt to repress the opposition or to rig the results. These also seem unlikely, and we expect the military, under Ky's leadership, to make a realistic endeavor to put the best possible face on its efforts to forge a genuine coalition with civilian elements. On balance, the odds favor the election coming out reasonably well for both the GVN and the US, particularly if the US provides active, discreet advice and counsel within the context of Vietnamese political realities. The military establishment appears almost certain to score a smashing electoral victory. The best hope is that, in doing so, it will facilitate the development of a broad political coalition comprising something approaching a majority of the electorate. Such a coalition could provide the basis for ultimate development of a genuine, cohesive, national party which would foster stability and provide a strong popular base for the GVN.

Declassified Documents Reference System Location:

1993-002470

Link to Full Text:

http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=04109128008