Declassified CIA documents on the Vietnam War

Situation in South Vietnam

August 11, 1965

February 16, 1993

Weekly report

NOT GIVEN

SANITIZED

24 p.

The two-day meeting on 4-5 August of the ruling military Directorate, and Premier Ky's subsequent press conference to announce the results of the meeting, dominated last week's political scene in Saigon. Contrary to advance speculation, there was no indication that the Directorate had expressed dissatisfaction with Ky's performance. Some of the decisions emanating from the meeting--particularly those projecting the possible punishment of once powerful officers now "exiled" abroad or in disfavor at home--did little to dispel rumors of continuing political rivalry. These rumors appear to have been abetted by suspicions among disparate Vietnamese political and religious circles that the return of Ambassador Lodge presages some new US political move, and that Premier Ky's mid-August mission in Taiwan and Thailand--about which few details have been provided--was deliberately timed to avoid Lodge's arrival. Ky's extemperaneous remarks at his press conference concerning the proper limits of friendship with foreign countries further served to fan such speculation. While reports from various Vietnamese sources have indicated increasingly open political maneuvering by General Thi, I Corps Commander, particularly among antigovernment Buddhists in Hue, there continues to be no firm evidence of any early move against Ky. With the exception of the current action at Duc Co, the relative lull since mid-July in Viet Cong battalion-size or larger commitments has continued. Small-scale Viet Cong activity in the area around Saigon and in the delta provinces has intensified. The current Viet Cong modus operandi generally conforms to a typical revolutionary warfare pattern. In the face of increasing US forces, and having sustained many casualties so far during their monsoon campaign, the Viet Cong probably have found it necessary to regroup, replace, and re-equip, and at the same time probe and assess the changing situation. For example, Viet Cong efforts to test and evaluate US reactions have been evident at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Bien Hoa. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong can maintain a hold on the country by continuing interdiction, sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, and harassing small-scale attacks, and withhold attacks in battalion strength or larger until exploitable opportunities are developed or presented.

NGUYEN CAO KY
HENRY CABOT LODGE
NGUYEN KHANH
DO CAO TRI
PHAM VAN DONG
THAI QUANG HOANG
TRAN NGOC TAM
PHAM VAN LIEU
NGUYEN CHANH THI
CHUNG TAN CANG
TRAN VAN DO
NGUYEN HUU CO
CAO VAN VIEN
THICH TRI QUANG
NGUYEN XUAN OANH
ALEXIS JOHNSON
NGUYEN TAT UNG
NORODOM SIHANOUK
PHAM VAN DONG
POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL POLICE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
RETAIL PRICES IN SAIGON
GOLD PRICES IN SAIGON
CURRENCY PRICES IN SAIGON
VIET CONG ACTIVITIES
VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITIES
VIET CONG TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
VIET CONG CASUALTIES
VIET CONG WEAPON LOSSES
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY CASUALTIES
SOUTH VIETNAMESE WEAPON LOSSES
PACIFICATION PROGRAM
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
CHIEU HOI PROGRAM
RETURNEE PROGRAM
PLEIKU PROVINCE
CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE
LONG AN PROVINCE
HAU NGHIA PROVINCE
PHUOC LONG PROVINCE
TAY NINH PROVINCE
GO DAU HA
BIEN HOA PROVINCE
RUNG SAT AREA
AN XUYEN PROVINCE
THOI BINH DISTRICT
NORTH VIETNAMESE 325TH DIVISION
THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THAILAND
PREMIER KY'S VISIT TO TAIWAN AND THAILAND
CAMBODIA
UNITED KINGDOM
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
COMMUNIST BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

1994-000036